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Gotta give a heads-up to my Brother on this one,
otherwise I might have missed it!...
Memos Show British Concern Over Iraq Plans
By
THOMAS WAGNER (Direct descendent of
Karl Marx! - tha malcontent)
Associated Press Writer June 18, 2:25 PM EST
LONDON (AP)
� When Prime Minister Tony Blair's chief foreign
policy adviser dined with Condoleezza Rice six months after Sept. 11, the then-U.S.
national security adviser didn't want to discuss Osama bin Laden or al-Qaida.
She wanted to talk about "regime change" in Iraq, setting the stage for the
U.S.-led invasion more than a year later.
(ap) - "Smith
told AP he protected the identity of the source he had obtained the documents
from by typing copies of them on plain paper and destroying the originals."
The Originals are Destroyed, the Source is unknown, yet the Dishonest on the
Left are calling for Impeachment on a Vague Claim in a Copied Memo... A Memo, by
the way, that Assumes that Saddam did in Fact have WMD in at least two places in
the Memo, yet the Left Conveniently Ignores that Information in favor of the
"fixed" reference, which cites no Specific Person, or Persons, nor anything of
Substance... Classic!
Here is an example of the Memo Assuming that Saddam had WMD: "The military were
continuing to ask lots of questions. For instance, what were the consequences,
if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban
warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on
Israel, added the Defence Secretary."
It's funny how nobody who is talking about this Memo mentions that part!
This is "the Smoking Gun" according to the Left: "Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction
of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy." First and foremost, it does not say that the Intelligence was
being Fixed, it says that the Intelligence and FACTS were being "Fixed around
the Policy"... Nobody is Specifically named, and even if they were, I don't see
a problem with it.... ASSUMING this is not another Burkett Fax, as was the case
with Dan Rather (D) and
Forgerygate. Far too many Assumptions have to be made about this Copy of a
Destroyed Memo without Source, and even if we make those Assumptions, it's not
really news to me. They made the Case to take Saddam out, and you don't do
that by Focusing on why we should not go to War. If we did that, the War
in Afghanistan would never have happened. There were plenty of Questions
in that War, and still are to this day, but that's not how the Victor in War
Wins in War. Saddam had WMD as Documented by the UN, and Foreign
Intelligence, including France and Germany's said he had WMD, so unless EVERYONE
was in on this with Bush (43), there is no story here, just a bunch of
Frustrated, Angry and Confused out-of-Power DemocRATS who think Petulant
Tantrums are the way to regain Power... It's endlessly Entertaining to me!
- tha malcontent)
To see Supposed Memo as Written by
a London Times Reporter, click here:
Forgerygate II?
President Bush wanted Blair's support, but British officials worried the White
House was rushing to war, according to a series of leaked secret Downing Street
memos that have renewed questions and debate about Washington's motives for
ousting Saddam Hussein.
In one of the memos, British Foreign Office political director Peter Ricketts
openly asks whether the Bush administration had a clear and compelling military
reason for war.
"U.S. scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and al-Qaida is so far frankly
unconvincing," Ricketts says in the memo. "For Iraq, `regime change' does not
stack up. It sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam."
The documents confirm Blair was genuinely concerned about Saddam's alleged
weapons of mass destruction, but also indicate he was determined to go to war as
America's top ally, even though his government thought a pre-emptive attack may
be illegal under international law.
"The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's WMD
programs, but our tolerance of them post-11 September," said a typed copy of a
March 22, 2002 memo obtained Thursday by The Associated Press and written to
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.
"But even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programs will not show much advance in
recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW (chemical or biological weapons)
fronts: the programs are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know,
been stepped up."
Details from Rice's dinner conversation also are included in one of the secret
memos from 2002, which reveal British concerns about both the invasion and poor
postwar planning by the Bush administration, which critics say has allowed the
Iraqi insurgency to rage.
The eight memos � all labeled "secret" or "confidential" � were first obtained
by British reporter Michael Smith, who has written about them in The Daily
Telegraph and The Sunday Times.
Smith told AP he protected the identity of the source he had obtained the
documents from by typing copies of them on plain paper and destroying the
originals.
The AP obtained copies of six of the memos (the other two have circulated
widely). A senior British official who reviewed the copies said their content
appeared authentic. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the secret
nature of the material.
The eight documents total 36 pages and range from 10-page and eight-page studies
on military and legal options in Iraq, to brief memorandums from British
officials and the minutes of a private meeting held by Blair and his top
advisers.
Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert who teaches at Queen Mary College, University of
London, said the documents confirmed what post-invasion investigations have
found.
"The documents show what official inquiries in Britain already have, that the
case of weapons of mass destruction was based on thin intelligence and was used
to inflate the evidence to the level of mendacity," Dodge said. "In going to war
with Bush, Blair defended the special relationship between the two countries,
like other British leaders have. But he knew he was taking a huge political risk
at home. He knew the war's legality was questionable and its unpopularity was
never in doubt."
Dodge said the memos also show Blair was aware of the postwar instability that
was likely among Iraq's complex mix of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds once Saddam was
defeated.
The British documents confirm, as well, that "soon after 9/11 happened, the
starting gun was fired for the invasion of Iraq," Dodge said.
Speculation about if and when that would happen ran throughout 2002.
On Jan. 29, Bush called Iraq, Iran and North Korea "an axis of evil." U.S.
newspapers began reporting soon afterward that a U.S.-led war with Iraq was
possible.
On Oct. 16, the U.S. Congress voted to authorize Bush to go to war against Iraq.
On Feb. 5, 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell presented the Bush
administration's case about Iraq's weapons to the U.N. Security Council. On
March 19-20, the U.S.-led invasion began.
Bush and Blair both have been criticized at home since their WMD claims about
Iraq proved false. But both have been re-elected, defending the conflict for
removing a brutal dictator and promoting democracy in Iraq. Both administrations
have dismissed the memos as old news.
Details of the memos appeared in papers early last month but the news in Britain
quickly turned to the election that returned Blair to power. In the United
States, however, details of the memos' contents reignited a firestorm,
especially among Democratic critics of Bush.
It was in a March 14, 2002, memo that Blair's chief foreign policy adviser,
David Manning, told the prime minister about the dinner he had just had with
Rice in Washington.
"We spent a long time at dinner on Iraq," wrote Manning, who's now British
ambassador to the United States. Rice is now Bush's secretary of state.
"It is clear that Bush is grateful for your (Blair's) support and has registered
that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for
regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion
that was very different than anything in the States. And you would not budge
either in your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very
carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was not an option."
Manning said, "Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed." But he also
said there were signs of greater awareness of the practical difficulties and
political risks.
Blair was to meet with Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, on April 8, and
Manning told his boss: "No doubt we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my
talks with Condi convinced me that Bush wants to hear your views on Iraq before
taking decisions. He also wants your support. He is still smarting from the
comments by other European leaders on his Iraq policy."
A July 21 briefing paper given to officials preparing for a July 23 meeting with
Blair says officials must "ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the
risks."
"In particular we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would
match our objective... A postwar occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted
and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the U.S. military
plans are virtually silent on this point."
The British worried that, "Washington could look to us to share a
disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more
precisely the means by which the desired end state would be created, in
particular what form of government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the
time scale within which it would be possible to identify a successor."
In the March 22 memo from Foreign Office political director Ricketts to Foreign
Secretary Straw, Ricketts outlined how to win public and parliamentary support
for a war in Britain: "We have to be convincing that: the threat is so
serious/imminent that it is worth sending our troops to die for; it is
qualitatively different from the threat posed by other proliferators who are
closer to achieving nuclear capability (including Iran)."
Blair's government has been criticized for releasing an intelligence dossier on
Iraq before the war that warned Saddam could launch chemical or biological
weapons on 45 minutes' notice.
On March 25 Straw wrote a memo to Blair, saying he would have a tough time
convincing the governing Labour Party that a pre-emptive strike against Iraq was
legal under international law.
"If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the U.S. would now be
considering military action against Iraq," Straw wrote. "In addition, there has
been no credible evidence to link Iraq with OBL (Osama bin Laden) and al-Qaida."
He also questioned stability in a post-Saddam Iraq: "We have also to answer the
big question � what will this action achieve? There seems to be a larger hole in
this than on anything."
� Copyright 2005 The Associated Press. All
rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or
redistributed.
(That depends on what the meaning of "may" is...
All commentary included on this website is the opinion of tha malcontent and is
based in the Truth. No Liberals, Marxists, Stalinists, Socialists,
Communists or DemocRATS were harmed in the making of this website, I promise!
- tha malcontent)
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